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1. 論文要旨 Thesis overview and summary of the presentation. 
 
This thesis investigates several issues of the government debt sustainability and 
independence of the monetary authority from the fiscal authority, particularly focusing 
on Japanese experience in the last two decades. Chapter I is an overview of the current 
situation in Japanese debt management from in terms of the growth of debt, possibility 
of fiscal inflation, and coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. Chapter II is a 
review of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), which is summarized by (a) the 
standard quantity theory of money, and (b) the fiscal equation. The latter describes the 
monetary base plus the government debt per unit of the price level as the present value 
of future government surpluses. The controversies and discussions about (b) and the 
role of money in this FTPL framework are summarized in Chapter III. Chapters IV and 
V constitute the main contributions of this thesis. Chapter IV depicts an FTPL-based 
empirical study of the Japanese debt. The student adopts two empirical strategies: (1) 
The Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP) is included in the assessment of the 
scope of the government of Japan and its debt. (2) The government surplus is measured 
by an implied economic surplus, rather than a primary balance. Combining these two 
strategies in the vector autoregressive framework, the student shows that the Japanese 
debt had been stable in the first decade in 2000s, and consistent with the FTPL 
prediction. This is distinct from Hoshi and Ito’s 2012 NBER working paper, in which 
Japan is a “puzzle” and defies a standard explanation. Chapter V introduces the 
framework of interacted monetary and fiscal authorities, given by Leeper and Walker’s 
2012 NBER working paper. The student proposes a model when each of two authorities 
behaves as if it dominates another, and names it a Lack-of-Coordination (LoC) regime. 
The student suggests that this regime is stable, in the sense that a deviation from it to 
either the true fiscal dominance or monetary dominance is unlikely to happen. Based on 
numerical simulations, the student suggests that in this LoC regime, (i) the hawkish 
monetary policy may make the inflation path more volatile and delay the reversion of 
the economy to its steady state, and (ii) it may lead to the “run” on government 
corresponding to negativity of the present value side of (b), which is caused by a recent 
government deficit in conjunction with a large discount factor. Chapter VI discusses the 
results in the thesis and concludes the entire project.  
 
During the final defense, the candidate presented for about one hour and subsequently 
the referees raised questions and comments. 
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2. 審査報告 Notes from the Degree Committee (including changes required to the thesis 
by the referees) 
 
The referees (in alphabetical order of their surnames) made the following comments 
before, in and after the defense based on the previous manuscript in December 2015 and 
the presentation in January 2016.  
 
Professor Junichi Fujimoto 
1) No need for detailed justifications of the FTPL, especially in the empirical part.  
2) Concern about the “doom’s day” scenario: is it consistent with rational expectation? 
If people suspects its possibility, why not happen right now? 
3) The manuscript is very long. Need more careful introductions to empirical and 
theoretical models, rather than just citing, e.g., “Leeper and Walker (2012)”.  
 
Professor Minchung Hsu  
1) On a generalizability of a “Japan puzzle”. Is it discussed in any other studies? Better 
to provide some discussion about how important it is. Also need a brief discussion 
about any other possible explanations for this puzzle. 
2) Is LoC story really applicable to Japan? In the history, inflation seems stable in 
Japan. 
3) About the empirical part: aren’t there any competing/alternative theories or 
empirical approaches? If properly accounting for FILP in these alternative 
frameworks may benefit, too, the core contribution of the empirical part is not its 
augmented support for the FTPL but the using FILP side of the government.  
 
Professor Shinsuke Ikeda  
1) A concern about the estimation of RHS in the fiscal equation. The presented result 
indicates mis-specified nature of the VAR model. 
 
Professor Tetsushi Sonobe  
1) “Government” may involve many, politically untouchable regions. Need to discuss 
these political economic aspects of the dissertation.  
2) Many scenarios of government scope, operation, and transfers (e.g., privatization) 
should be discussed.  
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Professor Kozo Ueda (Referee outside GRIPS) 
1) In Chapter III, Bassetto (2002) should be cited. This paper is the strongest and most 
convincing criticism against the FTPL.  
2) Page 85 in Chapter IV: ϕt  (the growth rate of government debts’ nominal values) 
Discussions seem inappropriate because you assume exogenous ϕt. If it is exogenous, 
it becomes inconsistent with equation (39) under rational expectations.  
3) Section V.6 Numerical example and potential cooperation. I suggest eliminating this 
section entirely. This game theoretic model is too ad-hoc. Because there is no 
structure, you can produce anything by setting arbitrary numbers.  
4) III.2 on page 34: “What is the Price Level?” This section is potentially interesting, 
but not quite clear.  
5) Page 51: Financial Assets. Are the foreign securities held by the FILP included? 
Relating this, how do you incorporate the pension on both asset and liability sides? 
6) Page 54: To calculate the real return r, do you use ex post (next period) or exante 
(expected) inflation? More explanations are needed. Moreover, nominal interest 
rates are predetermined at the time of issue, and thus, different from those of today. 
How do you take account of this?  
7) Section IV.4 VAR analysis. Discussions are extremely hard to follow, in particular, 
after equation (10). This section needs to be thoroughly restructured. How did you 
derive equation (10)? More explanations are needed. How did you derive equation 
(14)? Unknown values are two eta’s, while there are three restrictions in (13). Do 
you also solve beta? Then, how about beta in the equation below (11)?  
8) Page 64: You assume that an expected shock for fiscal surplus, epsilon, is zero. This 
assumption is crucial to obtain F in (17). But, is this plausible? To put differently, 
this assumption means that people do not expect an increase in tax in the future. 
More explanations are needed.  
9) Section IV.4(c) Inflation model. You assume a monetary policy rule by neglecting 
the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates. This assumption affects your results 
greatly. More explanations are needed. How did you derive equation (26) in sum? 
Since this seems a key equation in the chapter, intuitive accounts and discussions 
are needed. Moreover, what did you do to the left-hand side variable (expected 
inflation in the previous period) in your estimation?  
10) Page 73: I have a strong doubt on the following argument, “ (Cochrane (1999)) 
touches on the quantity of the outstanding government debts as a factor for the 
discount rates. That is, the real discount rate should increase if the government 
issues more debts.”  
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11) Figures IV-1 and thereafter: data sources should be briefly noted. 
12) It is not clear what exactly the contributions of this dissertation are.  
13) Concerns about the FILP data, as there may be “hidden debts”. 
14) Why incorporate only financial assets? Why not pension? Why not physical assets? 
Need to explain or admit limitations and caveat in the data selection. 
15) Concern about the Lack-of-Coordination (LoC) model: Leeper (1991) shows 
indeterminacy of equilibrium paths if both fiscal and monetary authorities take 
“aggressive” stances. Isn’t it corresponding to LoC? If so, then LoC has no 
determinant equilibrium path. 
16) Unclear what the “expectation” stands for. Is the interest rates ex-ante, or ex-post? 
 
Professor Yosuke Yasuda (in the audience of the final defense)  
1) It is not clear how the game-theoretic model of LoC is connected to any other parts 
of the dissertation.  
2) Ordinal or cardinal ordering in the numerical examples: aren’t ad-hoc settings 
driving the results?  
3) Need a careful distinction between LoC and Sargent-Wallace’s chicken game. How 
are they related? 
 
As the list above suggests, his manuscript and presentation invite many comments, 
particularly from the outside referee. Some of these are quite challenging. 
 
3. 最終提出論文確認結果 Confirmation by the Main Referee that changes have been done 
to the satisfaction of the referees 
 
Mr. Tatsuya Takeda has revised his thesis to incorporate the vast majority of the 
comments and challenges by the referees and has provided explanations of the changes 
he has made, as summarized in the separate file I attach to this report. The referees are 
satisfied with the revisions.  
 
4. 最終審査結果 Final recommendation. 
 
I recommend that the degree of Ph.D. in Public Economics should be awarded to Mr. 
Tatsuya Takeda.  
